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Safety · November 21, 2026 · By Cap. Renan Montano · 10 min read

Miami accident: what we know and what to learn

A summary of what the NTSB has published about the cargo Boeing 767 accident in Miami (September 6, 2026) and reflections for those of us studying aviation.

On September 6, 2026, a cargo Boeing 767 overran the end of the runway while landing at Miami International Airport. Five people on the ground lost their lives and three others were seriously injured. Both pilots survived.

This article does not seek to speculate or assign blame. It gathers what the investigating authority has made public, with links to each source, and offers some reflections for those of us training in aviation. Our condolences to the families and loved ones of the victims.

First: the investigation is still open

The investigation is led by the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), under case DCA26MA352. As of the date of this article:

  • The NTSB published a preliminary report on October 1, 2026, which it itself describes as “preliminary and subject to change”.
  • It has not determined the probable cause. A final report usually takes a year or more.
  • Everything below comes from official NTSB documents. If you find claims about “the cause” on social media, remember that there is still no official conclusion.

What happened, according to the NTSB

Item Official information
Date and time September 6, 2026, 13:53 Miami local time (EDT)
Flight 21 Air 7598, a domestic cargo flight operated for Amazon, from San Juan (Puerto Rico) to Miami
Aircraft Boeing 767-33A, converted to a freighter in 2016
Event Overran the end of runway 30 after landing and hit two vehicles on the ground
Injuries 5 killed and 3 seriously injured on the ground; 2 minor injuries among the crew
Conditions Daytime, instrument flight; thunderstorms at the airport

According to the report, the aircraft left the runway, knocked down the localizer and the approach lights, went through the airport perimeter fence, struck a pickup truck traveling on a perimeter road and a vehicle on NW 67th Avenue, and came to a stop about 1,200 feet (≈ 370 m) from the end of the pavement. There was a post-impact fire on the right wing. Both pilots evacuated the aircraft and airport firefighters responded immediately.

Aerial image of the northwest end of runway 30 at Miami airport, showing the distance of about 1,200 feet between the end of the pavement and the point where the aircraft stopped, NW 67th Avenue and the perimeter road
Figure 1. Runway exit area: the end of the pavement, the localizer and approach lights of runway 12, the perimeter road, NW 67th Avenue and the roughly 1,200 ft (≈ 370 m) to the point where the aircraft stopped. Source: NTSB, preliminary report DCA26MA352, figure 1 (Google Earth satellite image).

Source: NTSB, preliminary report DCA26MA352, pages 1–3 and 10–11.

The approach and landing, in data

These figures come from the flight data recorder (FDR) and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), and are preliminary:

Moment Data
Runway 30 threshold crossing ≈ 105 ft above ground level, ground speed of 177 kt
Touchdown ≈ 3,750 ft (≈ 1,140 m) past the threshold, at 160 kt
Length of runway 12/30 9,360 ft (≈ 2,850 m), including a displaced threshold
Speed brakes and reverse The speed brakes remained retracted and the thrust reversers did not deploy
Wheel brakes Applied at 146 kt, released about 8 seconds later and reapplied when ≈ 415 ft of runway remained
Runway exit At 113 kt

On the cockpit recorder, the NTSB summarizes that about 1 minute 42 seconds before the end of the recording one pilot warned that they were going too fast, and made further comments about the excess speed until the end. The NTSB notes that there was no consistent verbal response to those comments. The aircraft’s automated alerts (“sink rate”, “too low terrain”) sounded during the approach, and about 15 seconds before the end of the recording a go-around was called for.

Chart of the flight data recorder data between 13:52:25 and 13:53:35: altitude, vertical speed, ground speed and airspeed, throttle lever angle, flaps, brake pressure, speed brake lever and thrust reversers
Figure 2. Preliminary flight data recorder (FDR) data from 13:52:25 to the end of the data. An example of how to read it: ground speed (magenta) and airspeed (light blue) fall together; brake pressure rises after touchdown; the speed brake lever stays at 0 (retracted); the thrust reversers appear as "Not Dply" (not deployed); and the increase in the throttle levers toward the end corresponds to go-around power. Source: NTSB, preliminary report DCA26MA352, figure 5.

Sources: preliminary report, pages 2 and 6–7, and the NTSB update of September 9, 2026.

Weather and air traffic control

  • At 13:53 the airport weather report indicated wind from 190° at 17 kt gusting to 26 kt, with thunderstorms in the area. The runway in use was 30.
  • The NTSB points out that the controller cleared the landing without reporting the wind, and that the FAA’s rule for controllers (order JO 7110.65BB) requires reporting wind direction and speed when there is a tailwind component. About 4 minutes earlier, the controller had given the wind to another flight, but flight 7598 was not on that frequency.
  • There was no EMAS at the end of runway 30. EMAS is a bed of material that stops aircraft that overrun the runway; the FAA regulates its design in advisory circular AC 150/5220-22B.
Diagram of Miami International Airport with its four runways; runway 12/30 measures 9,360 by 150 feet
Figure 3. Miami International Airport diagram (FAA). Runway 12/30 (9,360 × 150 ft) crosses the airfield diagonally: the flight landed on runway 30, from the southeast, and exited through the northwest end, where runway 12 begins. Source: NTSB, preliminary report DCA26MA352, figure 3 (FAA diagram, "not for navigation").

Source: preliminary report, pages 4–6.

What we still do not know

The NTSB still has to answer important questions. Among them: why the thrust reversers and speed brakes did not deploy, what factors influenced speed and touchdown, what role the weather and wind information played, and which airport defenses worked or were missing. The aircraft performance study and the human factors, operations and air traffic control groups are still working. Until the NTSB concludes, any explanation is only a hypothesis.

What we can learn

The following reflections are not conclusions about the cause of this accident. They are principles the industry has learned over decades from many accidents and that this case reminds us of. Each includes references to go deeper.

1. A go-around is always an option

An approach must be stabilized (speed, configuration, path) before an operator-defined height; if it is not, the right decision is to go around, and the sooner the better. Flight Safety Foundation guidance recommends stabilizing the approach no later than 1,000 ft above the aerodrome in instrument conditions and 500 ft in visual conditions, and going around if it ceases to be stabilized below that height. Even so, according to SKYbrary, multiple data sources indicate that more than 9 out of 10 unstabilized approaches continue to landing: this is the so-called continuation bias. A go-around decided after touching the runway is much harder than one decided with altitude to spare.

To go deeper: Stabilised Approach (SKYbrary) · FSF ALAR Briefing Note 7.1: Stabilized Approach (PDF) · Go-Around Decision Making (SKYbrary).

2. The monitoring pilot must speak up, and the flying pilot must listen

Crew resource management (CRM) teaches that the monitoring pilot has an obligation to say what they see, clearly and concretely, and that the flying pilot must acknowledge it and act. A warning that gets no response has no effect. Practice direct phrases (“speed high, go around”) and cultivate the habit of always responding.

To go deeper: Crew Resource Management (SKYbrary) · FAA AC 120-51E: CRM training.

3. Aircraft alerts call for immediate action

Alerts such as “sink rate” or “too low terrain” exist to interrupt a pattern. Each operator’s standard operating procedures define how to respond; know them by heart.

4. Know the wind and the distance you need

Wind with a tailwind component increases ground speed and landing distance. According to the FAA advisory circular AC 91-79A, “Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Upon Landing”, a tailwind increases landing distance by 21% for the first 10 kt. Before landing, check the METAR or ATIS, calculate the wind component and the distance needed, and if the controller does not give you the wind, ask for it. To practice reading the weather report, read how to read a METAR.

To go deeper: FAA AC 91-79A (PDF) · Tailwind Operations (SKYbrary) · FSF ALAR Briefing Note 8.3: Landing Distances (PDF).

5. Use all braking means, and on time

Speed brakes, thrust reversers and wheel brakes combine to stop the aircraft. Knowing how much runway remains and applying each means without delay is a discipline that is trained.

Center pedestal of the Boeing 767 cockpit with labels pointing to the speed brake lever, the thrust reverser levers, the throttle levers, the flap lever, the fuel switches and the engine fire handles
Figure 4. Center pedestal of the Boeing 767 cockpit where the NTSB documented the position of the controls after the accident. It helps identify the braking means mentioned in this lesson: the speed brake lever, the thrust reverser levers and the throttle levers. Source: NTSB, preliminary report DCA26MA352, figure 7.

6. Defenses work in layers

An accident rarely has a single cause: it usually happens when several defenses fail or are missing at once: the controller’s information, the cockpit dialogue, the aircraft’s alerts, the airport’s design and the runway safety areas. That is why safety management systems (SMS) seek to identify hazards before they line up. More in what an SMS is.

To go deeper: Runway Excursions: causes and defenses (SKYbrary) · FAA AC 150/5220-22B: EMAS.

7. Safety is everyone’s business, and it also protects those on the ground

This time the victims were people working or passing through the airport’s surroundings, not on board. Operational safety includes ramp, maintenance, cleaning and aerodrome service staff, and anyone can contribute by reporting a hazard.

8. Humility in the face of the facts

It is easy, with hindsight, to say “I would have done something else”. Investigators work to understand and prevent, not to blame. Whoever studies aviation honors the victims by learning with rigor and respect, and by not repeating rumors.

For your training

  • Ask your instructor to review the stabilized approach criteria and to practice go-arounds at different phases.
  • Practice cockpit dialogue in the simulator, with standardized callouts and responses.
  • Always calculate wind component and landing distance before each approach.
  • Review the preliminary and final reports of investigations: they are free and valuable study material.

Sources and references

Official sources for the case (consulted on November 21, 2026):

Educational references:

The latest NTSB update as of the date of this article is from October 1, 2026. We will update this text when the NTSB publishes new findings or its final report.

By Cap. Renan Montano · Published on November 21, 2026 · Airline Pilot Academy